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Abstract During the last decade, many European countries have faced sizeable im-
PLJUDWLRQ LQÀRZVDFFRPSDQLHGE\KLJKSUHYDOHQFHRIQHJDWLYH VHQWLPHQWV WRZDUG
immigrants among majority members of the host societies. We propose that basic 
human values are one important determinant of such negative attitudes, and we 
seek to explain variation across countries in the strength of the effects of values. 
Based on Schwartz’ (1992, 1994) basic human value theory, we hypothesize that 
universalism values are conducive to positive attitudes toward immigration, while 
conformity-tradition reinforce anti-immigration sentiments. We furthermore hy-
pothesize that these value effects are moderated by two contextual variables. Both 
value effects are expected to be weaker in countries with a higher level of cultural 
embeddedness. Furthermore, negative effects of conformity-tradition values are hy-
pothesized to be cushioned by a lower proportion of immigrants in the country. A 
multilevel analysis of data from 24 countries from the fourth round of the European 
Social Survey (2008–2009) supports these hypotheses. Moreover, we demonstrate 
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that the measurement properties of the theoretical constructs exhibit equivalence 
across countries, thereby justifying statistical comparisons.
Keywords Basic human values · Attitudes toward immigration · 
Multilevel analysis · Cross-level interaction · European Social Survey · 
Measurement equivalence
Individuelle Werte, kulturelle Einbettung und immigrations-feindliche 
Einstellungen: Wie sich die Unterschiede in den Wirkungen von Werten 
auf Einstellungen zur Immigration in Europa erklären lassen
Zusammenfassung Im letzten Jahrzehnt sind viele europäische Länder von einer 
beträchtlichen Zuwanderung betroffen gewesen, begleitet von negativen Einstel-
lungen der Majorität gegenüber den Immigranten. Wir schlagen vor, dass Werte 
eine wichtige Determinante solcher negativen Einstellungen sind, und erklären die 
Variation in der Stärke der Effekte von Werten in den einzelnen Ländern. Auf der 
Grundlage der Theorie grundlegender menschlicher Werte von Schwartz (1992, 
1994) nehmen wir an, dass Universalismus Werte zu positiver Einstellung gegen-
über der Zuwanderung führen werden; im Gegensatz dazu führen Konformität und 
Tradition zu immigrationsfeindlichen Gefühlen. Wir nehmen ferner an, dass diese 
Wirkungen von Werten durch zwei Kontext-Variablen moderiert werden. Beide Ef-
fekte von Werten sind niedriger in Ländern mit einem höheren Grad von kultureller 
Einbettung, und weiter, negative Effekte der Werte-Konformität und Tradition wer-
den vermutlich durch einen niedrigen Anteil von Immigranten in einem Land ge-
dämpft. Eine Mehrebenen-Analyse mit Daten von 24 Ländern der vierten Welle des 
European Social Survey (2008 bis 2009) stützen diese Hypothesen. Darüber hinaus 
zeigen wir, dass die Messeigenschaften der theoretischen Konstrukte über die Län-
der hinweg äquivalent sind und deshalb die statistischen Vergleiche rechtfertigen.
Schlüsselwörter Menschliche Werte · Einstellungen zur Einwanderung · 
Mehrebenenanalyse · Cross-level-Interaktion · European Social Survey · 
Äquivalenz von Messungen
1  Introduction
European countries have faced a constant increase of immigration in recent decades 
(Hooghe et al. 2008). Approximately 3.4 million people immigrated into countries 
belonging to the EU-27 in 2004, the number increased to 3.8 million in 2008, and this 
trend appears to be continuing.1 Not surprisingly, substantial sociological research 
has been devoted to understanding the consequences and implications of this upsurge 
in migration. Much of this research has focused on one implication that is considered 
particularly worrisome, i.e., the level of anti-immigrant sentiment among members 
1 See http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home/.
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of the host societies. Several studies reveal a rapid rise and/or a high level of anti-
foreigner sentiment: Substantial proportions of the population of host societies favor 
denying equal rights to immigrants and perceive them as a threat to social cohe-
sion and order, culture, and traditions, and their economic well-being (Raijman et al. 
2008; Scheepers et al. 2002; Schlüter et al. 2008). In many European countries the 
popularity of anti-immigrant politicians or parties has risen and public opinion has 
shifted to a less welcoming position (Lubbers et al. 2002).
Previous research has sought to delineate the mechanisms underlying the gen-
esis of negative attitudes of majority members toward immigrants. It has focused on 
ERWKLQGLYLGXDODQGFRQWH[WXDOGHWHUPLQDQWVRIVXFKDWWLWXGHV$¿UVWOLQHRIUHVHDUFK
PDLQWDLQVWKDWVRFLRHFRQRPLFYXOQHUDELOLW\UHÀHFWHGLQORZHGXFDWLRQOHYHOVZHDN
labor market positions, and economic deprivation, accounts for the negative atti-
tudes. Various studies have tested these propositions with international datasets like 
the European Social Survey and conclude that vulnerable individuals fear losing their 
jobs due to competition from newcomers to the labor market who are willing to 
accept lower wages (Gorodzeisky 2011; Kunovich 2004; Pichler 2010; Raijman et al. 
2003; Semyonov and Glikman 2009; Semoyonov et al. 2006, 2008). Yet some studies 
also demonstrate reductions of perceived threat due to contact with immigrants (e.g., 
Semyonov and Glikman 2009).
A second line of research proposes that ideological dispositions are an important 
source of anti-immigrant attitudes and that political conservatism mobilizes negative 
sentiments that induce hostility to and prejudice against immigrants. Empirical stud-
ies have demonstrated repeatedly that right-wing individuals tend to reject immigra-
tion more strongly (Gorodzeisky 2011; Raijman et al. 2003; Semyonov et al. 2006, 
2008).
A third set of studies explains the emergence of anti-immigrant prejudice as due 
to contextual variables that affect negative attitudes directly or that moderate the 
effects of individual-level variables. These studies suggest that unfavorable eco-
nomic conditions on the country level accompanied by large-scale immigration are 
perceived as a threat to the economy and may induce hostile attitudes (Gorodzeisky 
2011; Meulemann et al. 2009; Pichler 2010; Quillian 1995, 1996; Scheepers et al. 
2002; Semyonov et al. 20062WKHUFRQWH[WXDOYDULDEOHVLGHQWL¿HGDVVRXUFHVRIKRV-
tile attitudes are negative media coverage (Schlüter and Davidov 2011) and national 
immigration policies (Schlüter et al. 2013; Weldon 2006).
In recent years, a number of authors have also noted the important role that human 
values play in the explanation of negative attitudes toward immigrants (Davidov and 
Meuleman 2012; Davidov et al. 2008a; Sagiv and Schwartz 1995; Schwartz 2006a, 
2007). These studies adopted Schwartz’ (1992GH¿QLWLRQRIEDVLFKXPDQYDOXHVDV
beliefs about the importance of broad goals as guiding principles in life. They used 
individual differences in values to explain negative attitudes toward immigrants over 
and above the effects of social structural position. Values are found to exert robust 
effects, some of which varied across countries.
Research has yet to examine the conditionsWKDWDIIHFWWKHLQÀXHQFHRIEDVLFKXPDQ
values on attitudes toward immigration, that is, the circumstances under which val-
ues contribute more or less to the explanation of anti-immigrant sentiments. Nor 
have researchers proposed a theory that might explain the variation in value effects 
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across countries. This study investigates variation in the effects of values on attitudes 
toward immigration across 24 European countries from different European regions. 
We will argue that an aspect of cultural values—cultural embeddedness (Schwartz 
2006b), that is, the extent to which individuals in the society are expected to strive 
toward shared goals rather than their own—serves as a moderator of the impact of 
values on anti-immigration attitudes. By trying to explain variation in the effect of 
individual values on attitudes toward immigration across countries in a systematic 
way, our study contributes to a better understanding of the conditions under which 
values are more prominent in explaining negative sentiments toward immigration.
To test these hypotheses empirically, we utilize an internationally comparable 
dataset that includes large samples from many European countries, the European 
Social Survey (ESS; Jowell et al. 2007). We derive latent variables that take measure-
ment errors into account (Bollen 1989) for our main theoretical constructs, and we 
test the equivalence of our constructs across countries (Billiet 2003). Testing for con-
struct equivalence has rarely been practiced in studies that apply multilevel analysis, 
although such equivalence is a necessary condition for a meaningful interpretation of 
multilevel analyses (Kim et al. 2012). Before turning to the empirical analyses, we 
present the theoretical background and propositions of the study.
2  Theoretical considerations
2.1  The value theory
Human values are ‘desirable transsituational goals, varying in importance, that serve 
as guiding principles in the life of a person or other social entity’ (Schwartz 1994, 
p. 21). Individuals’ values are ordered in a hierarchy of importance that is quite stable 
across time and situations.2 Schwartz (1992)3 has postulated that the full range of val-
ues recognized across societies form a motivational continuum; extensive research 
in over 80 countries has supported this theory that distinguishes 10 values (univer-
salism, benevolence, tradition, conformity, security, power, achievement, hedonism, 
stimulation, and self-direction). We will focus on the two values universalism and the 
XQL¿HGYDOXHFRQIRUPLW\WUDGLWLRQEHFDXVHWKH\KDYHEHHQIRXQGWRSUHGLFWDWWLWXGHV
2 In contrast to values, attitudes are not ordered hierarchically, are less stable, and refer to positive and 
negative evaluations of objects rather than to the importance of goals (Rokeach 1968; Schwartz 2006a). 
Values, but not attitudes, serve as standards to judge people, actions, and events.
3 We employ the Schwartz value theory rather than the Inglehart theory (e.g., Inglehart and Baker 2000) 
mainly for three reasons. First, Schwartz (1992, 1994) makes a better theoretical and empirical distinc-
tion between values and attitudes. Such a distinction is crucial for using values to explain attitudes and 
for guaranteeing discriminant validity between the concepts. Second, Schwartz makes a clear distinction 
between individual-level and societal-level values whereas Inglehart does not make such a distinction on 
the measurement level. We propose mechanisms to explain attitudes toward immigration on the individual 
level. Therefore, the Schwartz theory is better suited to test them empirically. Finally, the database we 
chose to test our propositions is the European Social Survey, which includes measures of anti-immigrant 
sentiments across a large set of European countries. This dataset included measurements for Schwartz’ 
rather than Inglehart’s values. See Becker et al. (2012) and Datler et al. (2012) for a discussion about dif-
ferences between the two theories.
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toward immigration4 (Davidov and Meuleman 2012; Davidov et al. 2008a; Sagiv and 
Schwartz 1995; Schwartz 2007).
2.2  Relations of values to attitudes toward immigration
2.2.1  The individual level
What mechanism links values to attitudes toward immigration? Values whose expres-
sion, attainment, or motivation may be promoted or blocked by immigration to a 
country are likely to affect attitudes toward immigration (Sagiv and Schwartz 1995). 
This mechanism is particularly relevant for two values, namely, universalism and 
conformity-tradition. Universalism values express the motivation to appreciate dif-
ferences among individuals as well as to understand, tolerate, and protect the welfare 
of all people, with an emphasis on the weak and vulnerable who are different from 
the self (Schwartz 2006a$GPLWWLQJLPPLJUDQWVZKROHIWRUHYHQÀHGWKHLUFRXQWU\
of birth in search of a better life provides opportunities to realize the goal of promot-
ing the welfare of the weak and vulnerable. Therefore, we expect a positive effect of 
universalism on attitudes toward immigration (hypothesis H1).
In contrast, we hypothesize that tradition and conformity values lead to negative 
attitudes toward immigration (hypothesis H2). This is because these values express 
the motivation to maintain the beliefs, customs, and practices of one’s culture and 
family and to avoid violation of conventional expectations and norms. The arrival 
of newcomers threatens the attainment of these values because immigrants from dif-
ferent cultures are liable to introduce new and unfamiliar practices and beliefs, to 
question common norms and conventions or to violate them out of ignorance, and to 
bring about change in the existing societal order.
Previous individual-level research has demonstrated the effects of the values 
universalism, tradition, and conformity on attitudes toward immigration in numer-
ous countries (e.g., Davidov et al. 2008a; Davidov and Meuleman 2012; Sagiv and 
Schwartz 1995; Schwartz 2007). The current study will provide a rigorous test of 
Hypotheses H1 and H2E\WU\LQJWRUHSOLFDWHWKH¿QGLQJDFURVVFRXQWULHV%XWDW
the same time, we take current knowledge a step further by addressing the following 
questions: How do value effects vary across countries, and how can this variation be 
explained?
2.2.2  Variability in value effects
The above hypotheses and the reasoning underlying them are stated as applicable 
across societies. We expect, however, that the strength of the effects of these basic 
human values varies across societies. In order for values to affect attitudes and behav-
4 In many empirical studies it was not possible to distinguish between tradition and conformity (see, e.g., 
Davidov 2010). Therefore, we decided to unify them in this study. This does not contradict the theory due 
to their shared motivation and proximal location in the value space. We did not use security as a predictor 
because of the different meaning it may have across countries which may lead to conceptual confusion. 
Furthermore, in additional exploratory analyses, security only has a relatively small effect because of its 
close content to conformity and tradition.
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LRUWKH\PXVWEHDFWLYDWHGLQVSHFL¿FVLWXDWLRQVRUFRQWH[WV6FKZDUW]2006a). Con-
WH[WXDOYDULDEOHVDUHOLNHO\WRLQÀXHQFHWKHLQWHQVLW\ZLWKZKLFKYDOXHVUHOHYDQWWR
immigration attitudes are activated.
7KH ¿UVW FRQWH[WXDO YDULDEOH ZH FRQVLGHU LV FXOWXUDO HPEHGGHGQHVV D FXOWXUDO
dimension for comparing societies (Schwartz 2006b). In so-called ‘embedded cul-
tures’, people are viewed as entities embedded in the collectivity. Meaning in life 
comes largely through social relationships, through identifying with the group, par-
ticipating in its shared way of life, and striving toward its shared goals rather than 
pursuing one’s own goals. Embedded cultures emphasize maintaining the status quo 
and restraining individuals’ actions that might disrupt in-group solidarity or the tradi-
tional order. In contrast, in less embedded cultures, people are viewed as autonomous 
entities who are encouraged to cultivate and express their own preferences, feelings, 
LGHDVDQGDELOLWLHVDQGWR¿QGPHDQLQJLQWKHLURZQXQLTXHQHVV
Embeddedness assumes that a person’s roles in and obligations to collectivities are 
more important than her unique ideas and aspirations, and in less embedded societies 
individuals are encouraged to express their uniqueness and independence in thought, 
action, and feelings (Schwartz 2006b). As such, cultural embeddedness should be 
distinguished from Hofstede’s (2001) concept of collectivism: Whereas collectivism 
refers to the way in which individuals and the surrounding group are actually related, 
embeddedness refers in addition to the norms that dictate how they should be related.5
This analytical framework implies that individuals’ personal values are more likely 
WREHVDOLHQWWREHDFWLYDWHGUDWKHUWKDQVXSSUHVVHGDQGWRLQÀXHQFHWKHLUDWWLWXGHV
and behavior in societies with less embedded cultures. Lesthaeghe and Moors (2000, 
p. 11) also inferred that ‘value orientations are … predictive for choices… in contexts 
with … high degrees of individual autonomy’. On these bases, we hypothesize that 
values have stronger effects on attitudes toward immigration in less embedded societ-
ies (hypothesis H3).
Our second contextual variable is the proportion of immigrants in a country. 
Group threat theory posits that people who live in conditions of intense competition 
for scarce goods are more likely to perceive immigrants as a threat (Stephan et al. 
2005; Coenders 2001; Scheepers et al. 2002; Quillian 1995, 1996). A high propor-
tion of immigrants in a country has been associated with negative attitudes toward 
immigration at the country level (Scheepers et al. 2002; Semyonov et al. 2006). We 
hypothesize that this is also the case across the 24 European countries we study here 
(hypothesis H4). Empirical evidence for an effect of the proportion of immigrants 
RQDWWLWXGHVWRZDUGLPPLJUDWLRQLVPL[HGZLWKVRPHDXWKRUV¿QGLQJVXSSRUWZKLOH
others do not. For example, Quillian (1995, 1996) or Coenders et al. 2004) found sup-
portive evidence for the effect of immigrant group size, but Semyonov et al. (2004) or 
Strabac and Listhaug (2008) did not. The test of Hypothesis H4 in the current study 
provides a rigorous test of this effect across numerous countries.
5 Our FKRLFH WR IRFXVRQFXOWXUDO HPEHGGHGQHVV UDWKHU WKDQRQFROOHFWLYLVP LVQRWRQO\ MXVWL¿HGEDVHG
on theoretical considerations, but is also supported by empirical arguments. We reproduced the analyses 
presented below using collectivism as a moderator for value effects (results not shown but are available 
XSRQUHTXHVW&URVVOHYHOLQWHUDFWLRQVIRUFROOHFWLYLVPDUHLQVLJQL¿FDQWZLWK7UDGLWLRQ&RQIRUPLW\RU
considerably weaker than is the case for cultural embeddedness.
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Yet more central to the purpose of this study, we hypothesize that the higher the 
proportion of immigrants in the country, the stronger the negative effect of confor-
mity and tradition on attitudes toward immigration will be (hypothesis H5). As noted 
above, immigration threatens the attainment of these values by introducing new and 
unfamiliar practices and beliefs. It increases the number of people who may question 
or violate common norms and conventions. The greater the proportion of immigrants 
from dissimilar cultural backgrounds, the greater the pressure for change in the soci-
etal institutions that people who emphasize conformity and tradition values cherish. 
Hence, we expect that these values will then show a stronger relationship with anti-
immigration sentiment.
There is mixed evidence for an effect of immigration levels on relations of values 
to immigration attitudes. Davidov et al. (2008a) found that values had a weaker effect 
on attitudes in countries with higher immigration levels. But Davidov and Meuleman 
(2012) found no variation across countries that differed in immigration levels in the 
effects of conservation values on immigration attitudes. Immigration levels are not 
HTXLYDOHQWWRWKHSURSRUWLRQRILPPLJUDQWV+RZHYHUWKHWZRDUHVXI¿FLHQWO\UHODWHG
VRWKDWWKHPL[HG¿QGLQJVIRUWKHIRUPHUDUHUHOHYDQWWRWKHLQWHUDFWLRQRIWKHODWWHU
with values that we predicted (hypothesis H5). No studies have examined the possi-
ble cross-level interaction effect of cultural embeddedness on relations of individual 
values with attitudes toward immigration which are postulated in hypothesis H3.
3  Data and measurement
3.1  Data
The analyses utilize the data of the fourth round (2008–2009) of the European Social 
Survey (ESS) (Jowell et al. 2007). In each of 24 European countries, strict prob-
ability samples of the noninstitutionalized populations aged 15 years and older were 
selected. In all, 41,965 respondents reported their attitudes and opinions regarding 
various social and political issues, their basic values, and a full list of background 
variables. The following countries, with their abbreviation and effective sample sizes 
in parentheses, were included in the analyses: Belgium (BE; 1,586), Bulgaria (BG; 
2,210), Cyprus (CY; 1,119), Czech Republic (CZ; 1,968), Denmark (DK; 1,505), 
Estonia (EE; 1,207), Finland (FI; 2,138), France (FR; 1,907), Germany (DE; 2,501), 
Great Britain (GB; 2,100), Greece (GR; 1,946), Hungary (HU; 1,513), Ireland (IE; 
1,476), Latvia (LV; 1,643), Netherlands (NL; 1,602), Norway (NO; 1,412), Poland 
(PL; 1,595), Portugal (PT; 2,228), Romania (RO; 2,007), Slovakia (SK; 1,755), Slo-
venia (SI; 1,175), Spain (ES; 2,341), Sweden (SE; 1,611), and Switzerland (CH; 
1,368).6
6 For further documentation about the data collection procedures, see http://www.europeansocialsurvey.
org/. Data can be downloaded from http://ess.nsd.uib.no/.
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3.2  Variables
Attitudes toward Immigration. Respondents were asked three questions: To what 
extent do you think [your country] should allow people (1) of the same race or ethnic 
group (2) of a different race or ethnic group (3) from poorer countries outside Europe, 
to come and live in your country? Response categories ranged from 1 (allow many 
to come and live here) to 4 (allow none). We recoded responses so that higher scores 
LQGLFDWHJUHDWHUZLOOLQJQHVVWRDOORZLPPLJUDQWVLQWRWKHFRXQWU\&RQ¿UPDWRU\IDF-
tor analysis (CFA) (Bollen 1989; Jöreskog 1971) demonstrated that the three ques-
tions load positively and strongly on a single factor. These questions were averaged 
to form an index that we named Allow.
Values.7KH(66+XPDQ9DOXHV6FDOHLVDPRGL¿FDWLRQRIWKH3RUWUDLW9DOXHV4XHV-
tionnaire (Schwartz 2007). It includes brief verbal portraits of 21 different people, 
gender-matched to the respondent. Each portrait describes a person’s goals, aspira-
tions, or wishes that point implicitly to the importance of a single value. For example, 
the following item describes a person for whom universalism values are important: 
“She thinks it is important that every person in the world be treated equally. She 
believes everyone should have equal opportunities in life.” For each portrait, respon-
dents answer the question: ‘How much like you is this person?’ choosing one of 
six labeled boxes ranging from ‘very much like me’ (1) to ‘not like me at all’ (6). 
Respondents’ own values are inferred from their self-reported similarity to people 
who are described in terms of particular values. We reversed the scores so that higher 
scores indicate greater value importance.
We used the three universalism items that tap the importance of tolerance, equality, 
and environmental concern, two tradition items that tap the importance of tradition, 
customs, religion, and modesty, and two conformity items that tap the importance 
of following rules, doing what one is told, and behaving properly. In CFA analyses, 
all items loaded strongly on their respective value factor. We therefore averaged the 
items to form two indices that we named Universalism (UN) and Conformity-Tradi-
tion (COTR).
Cultural embeddedness. In each country, we utilized scores based on responses of 
urban school teachers and university students to the Schwartz Value Survey (for 
details see Schwartz 2006b). School teachers’ values are considered a good proxy 
of society’s values as in their educational function in schools they are expected to 
convey and disseminate norms and values among young pupils and future genera-
tions. Data were gathered between 1990 and 2007. Evidence in Schwartz (2006b) 
reveals very little change in cultural embeddedness scores across extended periods 
of time even in countries that underwent major political and institutional change. We 
therefore combined the data from this whole period for the index. The items included 
were validated empirically as indicators of cultural embeddedness by means of mul-
tidimensional scaling with countries as the unit of analysis (Schwartz 2006b). The 
cultural embeddedness score was the average ratings in each country of the impor-
tance of 15 value items: social order, tradition, forgiving, obedience, politeness, 
being moderate, honoring elders, national security, cleanliness, devoutness, wisdom, 
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self-discipline, protection of one’s public image, family security, and reciprocation 
of favors.
Both the individual values and the country scores for embeddedness were derived 
from questionnaires distributed among individuals. However, embeddedness is a 
characteristic of national cultures on which societies differ whereas conformity and 
tradition values are variables on which individuals differ. The former refers to the 
prescriptions in a society for how people should relate, the latter to the goals that 
motivate individuals. The former emerges in analyses in which country means are the 
XQLWRIDQDO\VLVWKHODWWHUHPHUJHLQDQDO\VHVLQZKLFKLQGLYLGXDOVތYDOXHSULRULWLHV
are the unit of analysis. These two levels of analysis are conceptually and statistically 
LQGHSHQGHQW0RUHRYHUWKHYDOXHLWHPVWKDW¿WWRJHWKHULQWKHRU\DQGHPHUJHHPSLUL-
cally to measure conformity-tradition and cultural embeddedness, while partially 
overlapping, differ in a number of particulars. Of the 15 embeddedness items, seven 
measure individual values from conformity-tradition, but the other seven measure 
security, power, benevolence, and universalism values at the individual level. The 
latter include, for example, ‘wisdom’ and ‘forgiving’.7
Proportion of immigrants in a country. We operationalized this variable as the per-
centage of non-EU immigrants (foreign born) in the population of each country.8 The 
data for 2007 were downloaded from the website of the MIMOSA project (http://
mimosa.gedap.be/).
Control variables. Gender was scored 0 for males and 1 for females. Age was mea-
sured in years. Education was measured by the highest level of education achieved 
(0 = no education up to 5 = tertiary education completed). Subjective income was 
measured by responses to the question “Which of the descriptions … comes clos-
HVWWRKRZ\RXIHHODERXW\RXUKRXVHKROGތVLQFRPHQRZDGD\V"´RQDSRLQWVFDOH
(1 = living comfortably on present income, 4  ¿QGLQJ LW YHU\GLI¿FXOW RQSUHVHQW
income). Political orientation was measured by self-placement on a 0 (left) to 10 
(right) scale. Finally, religiosity was measured by responses to the question “…how 
religious would you say you are?” on a scale ranging from 0 (not at all religious) to 
10 (very religious).
3.3  Modeling strategy
We used multilevel analysis to take account of the two-level structure of the data, 
where individuals are nested within countries. We estimated a series of increasingly 
more complex models as proposed by Hox (2010). After estimating a so-called empty 
model, we included the sociodemographic variables as control variables. In the third 
7 Data on embeddedness across countries may be provided by the 4th author upon request.
8 The two countries with the largest share of non-EU immigrants are Estonia and Latvia. These countries 
host a very large minority group of ethnic Russians who have lived there for an extended period of time 
EXWGLGQRWUHFHLYHFLWL]HQVKLSDIWHUWKHFROODSVHRIWKH6RYLHW8QLRQ%HFDXVHRIWKLVVSHFL¿FFRQWH[WLQ
the Baltic States, the percentage of non-EU immigrants might represent a different reality and our indica-
tor might lack comparability. To rule out the possibility that this distorts our conclusions, we replicated all 
analyses in this paper excluding Estonia and Latvia. Results (available upon request) are virtually identi-
cal, and do not alter the conclusions.
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model, we added the universalism and conformity-tradition values at the individual 
level and the cultural embeddedness score and the percentage of non-EU immigrants 
at the country level. Finally, we included random slopes for the values and cross-
level interactions to test the hypothesized variations in the effect of individual values 
across countries.
We estimated all models with the restricted maximum likelihood procedure imple-
mented in SPSS 19. To deal with item nonresponse, we used multiple imputation 
(Rubin 1996; Schafer 1997). All variables were standardized (over the pooled data-
set), so all effects can be interpreted as standardized effects (Hox 2010; Snijders and 
Bosker 1994). Furthermore, the two value scales were group-mean centered (Hox 
2010, p. 68) before standardization, in order to avoid confusion between processes 
operating at the individual and country level. This procedure guarantees that the 
interaction effects we observe are actually cross-level interactions (as our theoreti-
cal framework predicts) rather than interactions at the country level (Hofmann and 
Gavin 1998).
4  Results
4.1  Testing for equivalence
$VD¿UVWVWHSZHHQVXUHGWKDWRXUPHDVXUHPHQWRIDWWLWXGHVWRZDUGLPPLJUDWLRQDQG
of individual values of universalism and conformity-tradition, our main constructs, 
were equivalent across countries (Billiet 2003). Equivalence of concepts is a neces-
sary condition before cross-cultural studies may be meaningfully conducted. In line 
with previous studies (Davidov 2008; Davidov and Meuleman 2012; Davidov et al. 
2008bZHHPSOR\HGPXOWLSOHJURXSFRQ¿UPDWRU\IDFWRUDQDO\VLV0*&)$%ROOHQ
1989; Brown 2006; Jöreskog 1971) to test for measurement equivalence across the 
24 groups (countries) in this study. The tests supported full metric and partial scalar 
equivalence, thereby permitting meaningful interpretation of a multilevel analysis 
(Davidov 2010).9
4.2  Descriptive overview
Table 1 provides country averages for the scales measuring attitudes toward immigra-
tion (Allow) and value priorities (Universalism and Conformity-Tradition) as well as 
scores on the two contextual variables (cultural embeddedness and the proportion of 
non-EU immigrants).
Willingness to accept immigrants varied substantially across countries. Attitudes 
were most positive in Sweden, followed by Poland, Norway, Germany, and Bulgaria. 
Rejection of immigration was strongest in Greece followed by Latvia, Hungary, Por-
tugal, and to a lesser extent, Cyprus and the Czech Republic. As shown in Table 1, the 
mean willingness score varied considerably across countries. The difference between 
the most (Sweden) and least (Greece) positive country was 1.46, which is consider-
97KHIXOODQDO\VHVDUHDYDLODEOHIURPWKH¿UVWDXWKRU
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able knowing that this is a standardized variable. The multilevel analysis sheds light 
on the sources of variation in willingness to accept immigrants both within countries 
and between them.
Embeddedness varied considerably across countries as well. Scores were highest 
in Latvia, Estonia, Cyprus, Bulgaria, and Poland and lowest in Germany, Sweden, the 
Netherlands, and Denmark. In the former countries we expect values to exert stronger 
effects whereas in the latter we expect them to operate less strongly.
4.3  Multilevel analysis
The results of the series of multilevel model analyses are reported in Tables 2 (Mod-
els 1–4) and 3 (Models 5–7).
Model 1 included only a random intercept to enable us to determine how much of 
the variance in the dependent variable is accounted for by individual-level variability 
and how much by between-country variability. Twelve percent of the variance is due 
Table 1 Country scores for attitudes toward immigration, the value scales, and the contextual variables
Country Allow (country 
average)
Universalism 
(country average)
Conformity-Tradition 
(country average)
% non-EU 
foreigners
Cultural Embed-
dedness Score
BE 0.17 0.12 0.03 6.10 3.25
BG 0.30 í 0.12 0.32 0.39 3.87
CH 0.28 0.37 í 0.29 9.56 3.28
CY í 0.33 0.30 0.43 7.67 4.04
CZ í 0.33 í 0.37 í 0.10 0.93 3.59
DE 0.32 0.08 í 0.27 7.72 3.06
DK 0.22 í 0.02 í 0.25 5.84 3.19
EE í 0.24 í 0.19 í 0.30 15.56 3.81
ES í 0.24 0.38 0.39 7.53 3.31
FI 0.00 0.11 í 0.16 2.24 3.37
FR 0.03 0.12 í 0.38 7.65 3.20
GB í 0.12 í 0.07 í 0.16 6.96 3.34
GR í 0.63 0.41 0.45 8.22 3.41
HU í 0.46 0.01 í 0.04 0.76 3.60
IE 0.07 0.20 0.18 3.97 3.41
LV í 0.51 í 0.28 í 0.07 14.58 4.46
NL 0.16 í 0.03 í 0.15 8.34 3.19
NO 0.37 í 0.28 í 0.21 5.61 3.45
PL 0.50 0.05 0.30 1.14 3.86
PT í 0.45 í 0.40 í 0.19 5.33 3.43
RO 0.04 í 0.24 0.20 0.44 3.78
SE 0.83 í 0.19 í 0.41 8.05 3.12
SI 0.09 0.15 0.21 9.95 3.71
SK 0.09 0.03 0.43 0.94 3.82
The allow, universalism, and conformity-tradition scales are standardized (Note that in the multilevel 
models, the value scales were group-mean centered before standardizing in order to guarantee that the 
interactions with context variables are due to actual cross-level interactions rather than macro-level 
processes)
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to country-level variability; hence, it is important to use multilevel analysis (Hox 
2010).
Model 2 regressed Allow (the index of attitude toward immigration) on the 
sociodemographic variables gender, age, education, and subjective income. Com-
pared to the empty model, the individual- and country-level variances dropped by 
5.0 % and 17 %, respectively, indicating that these variables explain considerable 
Table 2 Multilevel models explaining attitudes toward immigration (Models 1–4). (Source: ESS 2008–
2009, own calculations)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Par. SE Par. SE Par. SE Par. SE
Fixed effects
Intercept 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.06
Gender 0.01* 0.00 í 0.01 0.00 í 0.01 0.00
Age í 0.12*** 0.00 í 0.11*** 0.00 í 0.11*** 0.00
Educational level 0.12*** 0.00 0.10*** 0.00 0.10*** 0.00
Subjective income í 0.09*** 0.01 í 0.10*** 0.01 í 0.10*** 0.01
Conformity-Tradi-
tion (COTR)
í 0.12*** 0.01 í 0.12*** 0.01
Universalism (UN) 0.14*** 0.01 0.14*** 0.01
Left-right position í 0.08*** 0.01 í 0.08*** 0.01
Religiosity 0.05*** 0.01 0.05*** 0.01
Context variables
Embeddedness í 0.09 0.06
% non-EU 
immigrants
í 0.07 0.06
Cross-level interactions
COTR x 
embeddedness
UN x 
embeddedness
COTR x % non-EU 
immigrants
Variance components
Residual variance 0.882*** 0.006 0.838*** 0.006 0.809*** 0.006 0.809*** 0.006
Random intercept 0.124** 0.037 0.103** 0.031 0.103** 0.030 0.096** 0.030
Slope COTR
Slope UN
Intra Class 
Correlation
0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11
Explained variance
% reduced variance 
residual
0.05 0.08 0.08
% reduced variance 
intercept
0.17 0.17 0.23
Ni = 41,965; Nj = 24
Multiple imputation is used to handle missing data. All entries are standardized effects
COTR conformity-tradition, UN Universalism
*p < 0,05; **p < 0,01; ***p < 0,001
Individual values, cultural embeddedness, and anti-immigration sentiments  275
1 3
M
od
el
 5
M
od
el
 6
a
M
od
el
 6
b
M
od
el
 6
c
M
od
el
 7
Pa
r.
SE
Pa
r.
SE
Pa
r.
SE
Pa
r.
SE
Pa
r.
SE
Fi
xe
d 
ef
fe
ct
s
In
te
rc
ep
t
0.
01
0.
06
0.
01
0.
06
0.
01
0.
06
0.
01
0.
06
0.
01
0.
06
G
en
de
r
í 0
.0
1
0.
00
í 0
.0
1
0.
00
í 0
.0
1
0.
00
í 0
.0
1
0.
00
í 0
.0
1
0.
00
A
ge
í 0
.1
1*
**
0.
00
í 0
.1
1*
**
0.
00
í 0
.1
1*
**
0.
00
í 0
.1
1*
**
0.
00
í 0
.1
1*
**
0.
00
Ed
uc
at
io
na
l l
ev
el
0.
10
**
*
0.
00
0.
10
**
*
0.
00
0.
10
**
*
0.
00
0.
10
**
*
0.
00
0.
10
**
*
0.
00
Su
bj
ec
tiv
e 
in
co
m
e
í 0
.1
0*
**
0.
01
í 0
.1
0*
**
0.
01
í 0
.1
0*
**
0.
01
í 0
.1
0*
**
0.
01
í 0
.1
0*
**
0.
01
Tr
ad
iti
on
-C
on
fo
rm
ity
í 0
.1
1*
**
0.
01
í 0
.1
1*
**
0.
01
í 0
.1
1*
**
0.
01
í 0
.1
1*
**
0.
01
í 0
.1
1*
**
0.
01
U
ni
ve
rs
al
is
m
0.
14
**
*
0.
01
0.
14
**
*
0.
01
0.
14
**
*
0.
01
0.
14
**
*
0.
01
0.
14
**
*
0.
01
Le
ft-
rig
ht
 p
os
iti
on
í 0
.0
8*
**
0.
01
í 0
.0
8*
**
0.
01
í 0
.0
8*
**
0.
01
í 0
.0
8*
**
0.
01
í 0
.0
8*
**
0.
01
R
el
ig
io
si
ty
0.
05
**
*
0.
01
0.
05
**
*
0.
01
0.
05
**
*
0.
01
0.
05
**
*
0.
01
0.
05
**
*
0.
01
C
on
te
xt
 v
ar
ia
bl
es
Em
be
dd
ed
ne
ss
í 0
.0
9
0.
06
í 0
.0
9
0.
06
í 0
.0
9
0.
06
í 0
.0
9
0.
06
í 0
.0
9
0.
06
%
 n
on
 E
U
 im
m
ig
ra
nt
s
í 0
.0
7
0.
06
í 0
.0
7
0.
06
í 0
.0
7
0.
06
í 0
.0
7
0.
06
í 0
.0
7
0.
06
C
ro
ss
-le
ve
l i
nt
er
ac
tio
ns
C
O
TR
 x
 e
m
be
dd
ed
ne
ss
0.
03
**
0.
01
0.
03
**
*
0.
01
U
N
 x
 e
m
be
dd
ed
ne
ss
.
í 0
.0
5*
**
0.
01
í 0
.0
5*
**
0.
01
C
O
TR
 x
 %
 n
on
-E
U
 im
m
ig
ra
nt
s
í 0
.0
2*
0.
01
í 0
.0
2*
0.
01
Va
ri
an
ce
 c
om
po
ne
nt
s
R
es
id
ua
l v
ar
ia
nc
e
0.
80
4*
**
0.
00
6
0.
80
4*
**
0.
00
6
0.
80
4*
**
0.
00
6
0.
80
4*
**
0.
00
6
0.
80
5*
**
0.
00
6
R
an
do
m
 in
te
rc
ep
t
0.
09
6*
*
0.
03
0
0.
09
6*
*
0.
03
0
0.
09
6*
*
0.
03
0
0.
09
6*
*
0.
03
0
0.
09
6*
*
0.
03
0
Sl
op
e 
C
O
TR
0.
00
3*
*
0.
00
1
0.
00
2*
0.
00
1
0.
00
3*
*
0.
00
1
0.
00
3*
0.
00
1
0.
00
2*
0.
00
1
Sl
op
e 
U
N
0.
00
3*
*
0.
00
1
0.
00
4*
*
0.
00
1
0.
00
1*
0.
00
1
0.
00
3*
*
0.
00
1
0.
00
1*
0.
00
1
IC
C
0.
11
0.
11
0.
11
0.
11
0.
11
Ta
bl
e 
3 
M
ul
til
ev
el
 m
od
el
s e
xp
la
in
in
g 
at
tit
ud
es
 to
w
ar
d 
im
m
ig
ra
tio
n 
(M
od
el
s 5
–7
). 
(S
ou
rc
e:
 E
SS
 2
00
8–
20
09
, o
w
n 
ca
lc
ul
at
io
ns
)
276 E. Davidov et al.
1 3
M
od
el
 5
M
od
el
 6
a
M
od
el
 6
b
M
od
el
 6
c
M
od
el
 7
Pa
r.
SE
Pa
r.
SE
Pa
r.
SE
Pa
r.
SE
Pa
r.
SE
Ex
pl
ai
ne
d 
va
ri
an
ce
%
 re
du
ce
d 
va
ria
nc
e 
re
si
du
al
0.
09
  
0.
09
0.
09
0.
09
0.
09
%
 re
du
ce
d 
va
ria
nc
e 
in
te
rc
ep
t
0.
23
  
0.
23
0.
23
0.
23
0.
23
%
 re
du
ce
d 
va
r. 
sl
op
e 
C
O
TR
  
0.
25
0.
00
0.
16
0.
51
%
 re
du
ce
d 
va
r. 
sl
op
e 
U
N
í 0
.0
5
0.
65
0.
01
0.
67
N
i =
 
41
,9
65
; N
j =
 
24
M
ul
tip
le
 im
pu
ta
tio
n 
is
 u
se
d 
to
 h
an
dl
e 
m
is
si
ng
 d
at
a.
 A
ll 
en
tr
ie
s a
re
 st
an
da
rd
iz
ed
 e
ff
ec
ts
C
O
TR
 c
on
fo
rm
ity
-t
ra
di
tio
n,
 U
N
 u
ni
ve
rs
al
is
m
*p
 
< 
0.
05
; *
*p
 
< 
0.
01
; *
**
p <
 
0.
00
1
Ta
bl
e 
3 
(C
on
tin
ue
d)
Individual values, cultural embeddedness, and anti-immigration sentiments  277
1 3
variance on both levels of analysis. Women and those with higher education and 
income were more positive toward immigration whereas older people were consid-
HUDEO\PRUHQHJDWLYH7KHVH¿QGLQJVDUHLQOLQHZLWKZKDWKDVEHHQUHSRUWHGLQWKH
literature (e.g., Semyonov et al. 2006).
Model 3 added the individual values of universalism and conformity-tradition and 
also level of religiosity and left-right political orientation. These individual character-
istics added to the explanation of variance in attitudes toward immigration over and 
above the effects of the sociodemographic variables, primarily at the individual level. 
In line with previous studies (Davidov et al. 2008a; Davidov and Meuleman 2012), 
attitudes toward immigration were more positive among those high in universalism 
values and low in conformity-tradition values. The two basic values had the stron-
gest effects among the individual-level predictors. The inclusion of universalism and 
conformity-tradition is responsible for the lion’s share in the drop of residual vari-
ance between Models 2 and 3 at the individual level. Furthermore, attitudes toward 
immigration were more positive among more religious individuals and among those 
ZLWKOHIWZLQJSROLWLFDORULHQWDWLRQV7KLV¿QGLQJLVDOVRLQOLQHZLWKSUHYLRXVVWXGLHV
(see, e.g., Scheepers et al. 2002).
Model 4 added the macro-level variables, cultural embeddedness levels, and per-
centage of non-EU residents in each country, in order to examine their effect on varia-
tion between countries in attitudes toward immigration. Based on group threat theory 
(Quillian 1995, 1996), we hypothesized that greater proportions of immigrants in a 
country would increase competitive threat and, therefore, lead to rejecting immigra-
WLRQ7KLVK\SRWKHVLVZDVQRWFRQ¿UPHGSURSRUWLRQRILPPLJUDQWVLQDFRXQWU\GLG
QRWDFFRXQWIRUVLJQL¿FDQWEHWZHHQFRXQWU\YDULDELOLW\LQDWWLWXGHVWRLPPLJUDWLRQ
We had no reason to expect a direct effect of cultural embeddedness on attitudes 
toward immigration, nor did the analysis reveal such an effect. Thus, neither contex-
tual variable had a direct effect on attitudes toward immigration.
Model 5 investigated whether the effect of individual values on attitudes varied 
across countries and, if so, to what extent. In this model, we allowed the slopes of 
universalism and conformity-tradition values to vary across countries. The random 
VORSHYDULDQFHVRIWKHWZRYDOXHVZHUHVLJQL¿FDQWLQGLFDWLQJWKDWWKHHIIHFWVRIWKH
values do indeed vary across countries. The random slope variances provide a clear 
estimate of the size of the difference in the effects of the values. The standard devia-
tion of both random slopes equaled 0.055 (namely, the square root of the random 
VORSHYDULDQFHV7KLVLQGLFDWHVWKDWFRXQWU\VSHFL¿FYDOXHHIIHFWVGHYLDWHRQDYHUDJH
by 0.055 from the mean value effects over all countries. Inspection of the country-
VSHFL¿FYDOXHHIIHFWVQRWVKRZQLQGLFDWHVWKDW²LQVSLWHRIWKHFRQVLGHUDEOHFURVV
national variance in effect sizes—the direction of the effects of universalism and 
conformity-tradition values on attitudes toward immigration is the same across 24 
European countries.
Subsequently, we examined whether the variation across countries in the effects 
of values could be explained by the contextual variables, thus testing Hypotheses 
H3 (cultural embeddedness) and H5 (percentage of immigrants in country). Because 
the sample size at the country level is quite limited (N = 24), three separate models 
were estimated, each containing one cross-level interaction effect: universalism X 
cultural embeddedness (Model 6a), conformity-tradition X cultural embeddedness 
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(Model 6b), and conformity-tradition X percentage non-EU immigrants in the coun-
try (Model 6c). Additionally, Figs. 1, 2, and 3 visualize how variation in the effects 
Fig. 2 Variation across countries in the effects of universalism values on attitudes toward immigration as a 
function of the level of cultural embeddedness in the country. (Source: ESS 2008–2009, own calculations. 
For country abbreviations see text)
 
Fig. 1 Variation across countries in the effects of conformity-tradition values on attitudes toward immi-
gration as a function of the level of cultural embeddedness in the country. (Source: ESS 2008–2009, own 
calculations. For country abbreviations see text)
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of the basic individual values is related to the contextual variables. The cross-level 
interaction terms estimate the size of these relationships.
Models 6a and 6b indicate that the interaction terms of cultural embeddedness 
ZHUH VLJQL¿FDQWZLWK ERWK FRQIRUPLW\WUDGLWLRQ YDOXHV DQGZLWK XQLYHUVDOLVPYDO-
ues. Thus, the level of cultural embeddedness in a country moderated the effects of 
universalism and conservation on attitudes toward immigration. In less culturally 
HPEHGGHGVRFLHWLHVYDOXHVKDGVWURQJHUHIIHFWVRQDWWLWXGHV7KHQHJDWLYHFRHI¿FLHQW
for the interaction between cultural embeddedness and universalism values indicates 
that the positive main effect of universalism values on attitudes toward immigration 
was weaker in countries high on embeddedness and stronger in countries low on 
HPEHGGHGQHVV7KHSRVLWLYHFRHI¿FLHQWIRUWKHLQWHUDFWLRQEHWZHHQFXOWXUDOHPEHG-
dedness and conformity-tradition values indicates that the negative main effect of 
these values on attitudes toward immigration was weaker in countries high on embed-
dedness and stronger in countries low on embeddedness. In sum, in countries high 
in cultural embeddedness, individual values had a weaker effect on attitudes toward 
immigration. Cultural embeddedness can explain 25 % of the variation in the effect of 
conformity-tradition and no less than 65 % of the variation in the effect of universal-
LVP7KHVH¿QGLQJV¿WWKHWKHRUHWLFDODUJXPHQWWKDWLQGLYLGXDOYDOXHVDUHPRUHOLNHO\
to be activated and to guide attitudes in less culturally embedded societies, that is, 
societies whose culture encourages pursuing one’s own goals and expressing one’s 
unique preferences.
0RGHO F UHYHDOV D VLJQL¿FDQW FRHI¿FLHQW IRU WKH LQWHUDFWLRQ WHUP EHWZHHQ WKH
percentage of non-EU foreigners in a country and conformity-tradition values. The 
QHJDWLYHFRHI¿FLHQWRIWKLVLQWHUDFWLRQLQGLFDWHVWKDWWKHQHJDWLYHPDLQHIIHFWRIFRQ-
Fig. 3 Variation across countries in the effects of conformity-tradition values on attitudes toward immigra-
tion as a function of the percentage of non-EU population in the country. (Source: ESS 2008–2009, own 
calculations. For country abbreviations see text)
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formity-tradition values on attitudes toward immigration was stronger in countries 
where the proportion of the immigrant population is higher, that is, people high in 
conformity-tradition values reject immigration more strongly in countries with larger 
LPPLJUDQWSRSXODWLRQVFRQ¿UPLQJRXU¿IWKK\SRWKHVLV7KLV¿WVWKHWKHRUHWLFDODUJX-
ment that a larger proportion of immigrants in a country increases the potential for 
societal change, intensifying the threat experienced by people for whom it is espe-
cially important to preserve convention, social norms, and customs. Consequently, 
these people reject immigration even more strongly in countries with large propor-
tions of immigrants. Sixteen percent of the variability in the effect of conformity-tra-
dition on attitudes toward immigration was explained by this cross-level interaction.
0RGHO  ¿QDOO\ LQFOXGHV DOO WKUHH FURVVOHYHO LQWHUDFWLRQV VLPXOWDQHRXVO\7KH
¿QGLQJ WKDW WKHUHVXOWVDUHYLUWXDOO\ LGHQWLFDO WR WKRVHRI0RGHOVD±FHVVHQWLDOO\
corroborates the robustness of the results.
7KH IXOO VHW RI ¿QGLQJV UHYHDOV WKDW XQLYHUVDOLVP DQG FRQIRUPLW\WUDGLWLRQ YDO-
ues exert strong effects on attitudes toward immigrants in many different countries. 
0RUHRYHU WKH VWUHQJWK RI WKHVH HIIHFWV YDULHV VLJQL¿FDQWO\ DFURVV FRXQWULHV 7KLV
variation depends to a substantial extent on the level of cultural embeddedness and 
the proportion of non-EU immigrants in each country.
5  Summary and conclusions
European countries have faced a constant increase of immigration in recent decades, 
accompanied by a rapid rise in and/or a high level of anti-foreigner sentiment. In 
many European countries the popularity of anti-immigrant politicians or parties has 
risen and public opinion has shifted to a less welcoming position. This study built 
upon previous studies that have shown the important role of basic human values as 
determinants of negative attitudes to immigrants. We hypothesized that more positive 
attitudes toward immigration would be found among individuals who give higher 
priority to universalism values, and contrastingly, more negative attitudes would 
be found among individuals who give higher priority to conformity-tradition val-
ues. The present study sought to explain variation across countries in these effects 
RIYDOXHVRQDWWLWXGHV:HLGHQWL¿HGWZRFRQWH[WXDOYDULDEOHVOLNHO\WRH[SODLQWKLV
variation, cultural embeddedness and proportion of immigrants in the population. We 
expected cultural embeddedness to play an important role in moderating these effects 
across countries.
We hypothesized that the effects of the two basic individual values are weaker in 
societies whose culture is higher on embeddedness (vs. autonomy). The rationale 
behind this cross-level interaction is that in more embedded societies, people are 
VRFLDOL]HGDQGHQFRXUDJHGWRPDLQWDLQJURXSVROLGDULW\DQGWR¿QGPHDQLQJLQOLIH
through identifying with and pursuing the goals of the groups of which they are 
members. In less embedded societies they are socialized and encouraged to cultivate 
their own unique preferences and ideas and to pursue their own personal goals. Thus, 
SHUVRQDOYDOXHVDUHPRUHOLNHO\WREHVDOLHQWUHDGLO\DFWLYDWHGDQGKHQFHWRLQÀXHQFH
attitudes more in less embedded societies. We further hypothesized that the negative 
effect of conformity-tradition values on attitudes toward immigration is stronger in 
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countries with a higher percentage of immigrants. Immigrants potentially threaten 
the maintenance of accepted customs, traditions, and norms, and the larger the pro-
portion of immigrants the greater the threat to the status quo. This threat directly 
challenges the goals of conformity-tradition values and is, therefore, likely to activate 
WKHPDVVRXUFHVRILQÀXHQFHRQDWWLWXGHV
To test our hypotheses, we utilized the data of 24 European countries from the 
fourth round of the European Social Survey (2008–2009). We analyzed the data with 
multilevel models because we wished to examine effects at both the individual and 
country level and to test cross-level interactions. Because constructs are not compa-
rable across countries unless their measurement is equivalent, we used multigroup 
FRQ¿UPDWRU\ IDFWRU DQDO\VLV WR HVWDEOLVK WKH QHFHVVDU\ PHWULF DQG SDUWLDO VFDODU
equivalence of the value and attitude constructs. This permitted meaningful interpre-
tation of the multilevel analysis.
7KHDQDO\VHV ODUJHO\ VXSSRUWHG WKHK\SRWKHVHV3UHYLRXV¿QGLQJVRI VLJQL¿FDQW
effects of universalism, conformity, and tradition values on attitudes toward immi-
gration were replicated. Universalism values predicted more positive attitudes and 
conformity-tradition values predicted more negative attitudes. These effects were 
UREXVWLQWKHVHQVHWKDWWKH\ZHUHVLJQL¿FDQWO\SRVLWLYHIRUXQLYHUVDOLVPDQGQHJD-
tive (for conformity-tradition) in virtually all countries. Nonetheless, the strength 
of these value effects varied across countries. The hypothesized effects of the two 
country-level contextual variables on the strength of value effects were supported by 
the data. In countries with less embedded cultures, both values had stronger effects 
than in countries with more embedded cultures. Moreover, in countries with higher 
proportions of non-EU immigrants, the effect on attitudes of conformity-tradition 
values was stronger. The proportion of non-EU immigrants in a country had no direct 
effect on attitudes toward immigration, replicating previous studies (e.g., Semyonov 
et al. 2004; Strabac and Listhaug 2008).
7KH¿QGLQJVGHPRQVWUDWHGWKDWLQGLYLGXDOV¶YDOXHVSOD\DQLPSRUWDQWUROHLQWKH
explanation of attitudes toward immigration even after controlling their sociodemo-
JUDSKLFFKDUDFWHULVWLFV,QGHHGXQGHUOLQLQJWKHVLJQL¿FDQFHRIYDOXHV WKHLUHIIHFWV
were stronger than the effects of the sociodemographic characteristics in standard-
ized terms. Thus, when designing policies to increase public support for immigration, 
values within the population should be taken into account. Values are largely shaped 
and crystallized during adolescence and remain relatively stable thereafter, barring 
major traumas or therapy (Hitlin and Piliavin 2004; Inglehart 1997). This suggests 
that policies should be aimed at young people in order to affect the impact of values 
on attitudes to immigration.
7KH¿QGLQJVIRUFXOWXUDOHPEHGGHGQHVVGHPRQVWUDWHWKDWWKLVFXOWXUDOGLPHQVLRQ
does not affect attitudes directly. However, its importance and that of the proportion 
of immigrants in the society may primarily be through increasing or decreasing the 
likelihood that the values relevant to attitudes will be activated. Indeed, individuals’ 
personal values are more likely to be salient, to be activated rather than suppressed, 
DQGWRLQÀXHQFHWKHLUDWWLWXGHVDQGEHKDYLRULQVRFLHWLHVZLWKOHVVHPEHGGHGFXOWXUHV
2XU¿QGLQJVVXJJHVWWKDWWKHLQGLYLGXDOOHYHOHIIHFWVRIYDOXHVDUHKLJKO\UREXVW\HW
they are nonetheless moderated.
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This is study is not without limitations. In particular, our conclusions regarding the 
cross-level interaction might be challenged by the fact that this dimension of national 
culture correlates substantively with other contextual variables, such as a lower GDP, 
a lower human development index (HDI), poorer education on average, and having 
a communist past. Such factors may have reduced the quality of responses to the 
values questionnaire in high embedded countries and as a result could account for 
the moderation. Unfortunately, the small sample size at the country level does not 
allow us to control for these factors and to rule out the possibility that the cross-level 
interaction is spurious.
2XU¿QGLQJVVXJJHVWWKDWYDULDELOLW\DFURVVFRXQWULHVLQDWWLWXGHVWRZDUGLPPLJUD-
tion may be accounted for to a large extent by variability in individual values com-
bined with the level of cultural embeddedness and size of the immigrant population 
in the country. However, to understand shifts in such attitudes over time, we may 
need other explanations. Values tend to display high stability over time and do not 
offer a convincing mechanism for studying longitudinal change in anti-immigrant 
sentiments. Studies suggest instead that worsening economic conditions (Semyonov 
et al. 2006, 2008), immigration policies (Schlüter et al. 2013) or change in media 
coverage (Schlüter and Davidov 2011) may offer, at least in part, explanations for 
such longitudinal variation in negative attitudes toward immigration.
Given the continuing increase of immigration around the world and the persis-
tence and growth of negative attitudes toward immigration, it is critical to under-
stand the sources of these attitudes. Promoting positive attitudes toward immigration 
PD\EHEHQH¿FLDOERWKIRULPPLJUDQWVDQGIRUWKHLUUHFHLYLQJVRFLHWLHV,QWKHORQJ
run, immigration has generally strengthened societies economically (Borjas 1995; 
Dustmann et al. 2010), but opposition from members of the host society undermines 
VRFLDOFRKHVLRQ,QWKHSUHVHQWVWXG\ZHKDYHLGHQWL¿HGWZRUHOHYDQWYDOXHVWKDW
could be targets of socialization, (2) suggested mechanisms through which these val-
XHVLQÀXHQFHDWWLWXGHVDQGLQYHVWLJDWHGWKHFLUFXPVWDQFHVLQZKLFKWKHVHPHFKD-
QLVPVRSHUDWHPRUHVWURQJO\7KHRUL]LQJWKDWLGHQWL¿HVRWKHUUHOHYDQWYDULDEOHVDQG
that investigates possible cross-national variation in their effects on attitudes toward 
immigration is needed. Equally important, it is necessary to deal with the method-
ological issue of equivalence of measurement when studying these new variables. By 
ensuring this critical prerequisite, we were able to study the effects of values on a key 
attitude across countries and to draw reliable conclusions.
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